Towards a Classification of Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumptions in Cyclic Groups by Kraiem Firas Alexandre
Towards a Classification of
Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumptions in Cyclic
Groups









Department of Computer and Mathematical Sciences
Graduate School of Information Sciences
Tohoku University
17 July 2019
Submitted to Tohoku University




Inspired by the work of Ghadafi and Groth on a certain type of computa-
tional hardness assumptions in cyclic groups (which they call “target assump-
tions”), we initiate in this thesis an analogous work on another type of hardness
assumptions, namely the “knowledge-of-exponent” assumptions (KEAs). Orig-
inally introduced by Damg̊ard to construct practical encryption schemes secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks, KEAs have subsequently been used primarily
to construct succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs), and
proven to be inherent to such constructions.
Using a proof technique first introduced by Bellare and Palacio (but acknowl-
edged by them as being due to Halevi), we first investigate the internal structure
of the q-power knowledge-of-exponent (q-PKE) family of assumptions introduced
by Groth, which is thus far the most general instance of KEAs in the literature.
Namely, we give evidence showing that the assumptions in the q-PKE family
appear to increase in strength as the parameter q grows.
We then introduce a generalisation of the q-PKE family, which is again in-
spired by the “target assumptions” of Ghadafi and Groth. Namely, the univari-
ate monomial parameters that appear in the q-PKE assumptions are replaced
by multivariate rational functions. We call the resulting assumptions “rational
knowledge-of-exponent assumptions” (RKEAs), and as a first step towards a full
classification of this class of assumptions, we show that the rational functions
may be replaced by polynomials.
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Cryptography can be broadly defined as the design of systems, called crypto-
graphic systems or cryptographic schemes, that are capable of maintaining their
functionality in the presence of adversarial entities that attempt to make them
deviate from their intended behaviour [16]. In the classical cryptographic task of
encryption, for instance, a cryptographic system called an encryption scheme is
used by two parties to exchange messages over a public channel in such a way as
to make it impossible for any third party to obtain the contents of the exchanged
messages. This property, called privacy or confidentiality, must be maintained
regardless of the strategy employed by such a third party in its attempts. In such
schemes, one of the parties (the sender) first applies a process called encryption
to the message they wish to send, yielding an “encrypted form” thereof, called
a ciphertext. The sender then transmits (over the public channel) the cipher-
text to the other party (the receiver), who applies a process called decryption to
reverse the encryption process and recover the original message (the plaintext).
Since the ciphertext is sent over the public channel, any third party can obtain it;
privacy requires that even such a third party should not be able to obtain the
corresponding plaintext.
A question that immediately arises when considering such schemes is how
one should evaluate their “security”, i.e., whether and to what extent they satisfy
the privacy requirement. The “classical” approach, based on information theory
and pioneered by Shannon during the Second World War [28], asserts that such
schemes should be considered secure if (and only if) the ciphertexts they produce
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do not contain any “information” about the corresponding plaintexts. However,
a major drawback of this approach is that any scheme that is “secure” in this sense
requires the parties to exchange a priori a secret “encryption key” which must
be as long as the messages they wish to subsequently exchange securely. This
requirement severely limits the applicability of such schemes when the amount of
data to be transmitted securely is large, as is routine over the modern Internet.
The “modern” approach, based on computational complexity theory and pi-
oneered around 1980 [10, 18, 27] asserts that such schemes should be considered
secure if (and only if) any information about a plaintext that is contained in
a corresponding ciphertext cannot be “efficiently” obtained by any third party.
In other words, it is permissible for a ciphertext to contain information about
the corresponding plaintext, as long as such information cannot be efficiently ob-
tained by a third party. Under this new paradigm, encryption schemes that make
it possible to securely and efficiently transmit large amounts of data became con-
ceivable, and indeed such schemes are routinely used today. On the other hand,
because such schemes are based on computational complexity theory, our ability
to reason about them, and in particular to prove their security, is constrained by
our knowledge in that field, which at this point in history can be fairly described
as rudimentary (as illustrated for instance by our inability to answer the funda-
mental question of whether or not it is more difficult to discover a solution to a
problem than to merely check whether a given solution is correct).
Therefore, an important drawback of the complexity-theoretic approach is
that the security of most cryptographic systems cannot currently be proved un-
conditionally, and must be proved under the assumption that certain computa-
tional tasks are difficult (in a suitable sense). Of course, in order to increase our
confidence in the security of such systems, it is necessary to increase our con-
fidence in the validity of the assumptions under which their security is proved.
Traditionally, this was done by admitting as valid the assumption that a problem
is difficult when a considerable amount of research effort had been devoted to the
search of efficient solutions to it without any (or much) success. (One such prob-
lem is the integer factoring problem [7]: given an integer, find a non-trivial factor
of it.) In recent years, however, new assumptions are introduced very frequently,
and, as pointed out for instance by Naor [23], it is sometimes not clear whether
proving the security of a system under a new assumption is much different from
simply assuming that the system is secure.
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This proliferation of new assumptions raises questions both for cryptogra-
phers, who design new cryptographic systems, and for cryptanalysts, who attempt
to “break” those systems by showing that the underlying assumptions are in fact
false. For the former, what are the best assumptions on which to base their con-
structions? And for the latter, what are the best assumptions on which to focus
their efforts? A solution to these dilemmas was proposed by Ghadafi and Groth
in 2017 [15] for a class of assumptions which they call “target assumptions” and
which includes for instance the well-known computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
assumption [10]. Their idea was to firstly identify a large class of assumptions
(the “target assumptions”) which captures many assumptions already used in the
literature as well as some which may appear in the future. In a target assumption,
an adversary is given some elements of a cyclic group, and must compute another,
prescribed group element, the assumption being that no adversary can efficiently
perform this task. In the CDH assumption, for instance, the adversary is given a
triple of the form (g, ga, gb), where g is a generator of a cyclic group G of prime or-
der q and a, b are random integers in {0, . . . , q−1}, and must compute the element
gab of G. Secondly, they identify a small subclass of assumptions (called “Uber-
assumptions”) within the large class, and show that if all the Uber-assumptions
hold, then all the target assumptions hold as well. Namely, they identify as
Uber-assumptions the family consisting of the q-Generalised Diffie-Hellman Ex-
ponent (q-GDHE) family of assumptions [4, 5] and a new family of assumptions
which they name the q-Simple Fractional (q-SFrac) family. Ghadafi and Groth
additionally study the internal structure of both families of assumptions, and
in particular they show that the assumptions in the q-GDHE family appear to
strictly increase in strength as the parameter q grows (i.e., for any q it is true that
(q + 1)-GDHE implies q-GDHE, but the converse is not true for generic group
adversaries [6, 24, 29]).
Such a result is useful both to cryptographers and to cryptanalysts. Cryp-
tographers can use any target assumption as the basis of their systems, and be
confident that they will remain secure at least as long as none of the Uber-
assumptions is broken (since if their chosen assumption is false, then at least
one Uber-assumption is false as well). Cryptanalysts, meanwhile, have a higher
chance of success if they focus on the Uber-assumptions, since they give a small
set of assumptions that is guaranteed to contain at least one false assumption
(unless all the assumptions in the large class are true, in which case there is no
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hope of proving that any assumption is false anyway). Of course, the usefulness
of such a result can be increased either by increasing the size of the large class
(since then cryptographers have more assumptions at their disposal) or by de-
creasing the size of the class of Uber-assumptions (since then cryptanalysts can
focus their efforts on a smaller number of assumptions). It is for this reason
that Ghadafi and Groth apply their analysis to a large class of assumptions (the
“target assumptions”), which is a generalisation of existing assumptions.
In this thesis, we attempt to apply a similar analysis to another type of as-
sumptions, called “knowledge-of-exponent assumptions” (KEAs). In a KEA, as
in a target assumption, an adversary is given some elements of a cyclic group
of prime order. However, the adversary is not tasked with computing a pre-
scribed group element. Rather, he must compute a pair of group elements with
a prescribed relationship between them. Moreover, the assumption is not that
performing this task is infeasible, but that it is feasible only in a prescribed man-
ner. For instance, the first KEA (introduced by Damg̊ard in 1991 [8] and which
we call KEA1 following Bellare and Palacio [3]) asserts that an adversary which
is given a pair (g, ga) (where again g is a generator of a cyclic group G of prime
order q and a is a random integer in {0, . . . , q − 1}) has only one feasible way of
computing a pair (u, v) of elements of G where v = ua. Namely, the adversary
must choose an integer k and compute u = gk and v = (ga)k. This is formalised
by saying that for every efficient adversary that outputs such a pair (u, v), there
must exist an extractor which outputs an integer k such that u = gk. Intuitively,
because the adversary must, at some point during its execution, compute such
an integer k, it must be possible to construct an extractor that computes k in
the same manner and outputs it instead of (u, v).
KEAs were initially criticised for not being falsifiable, in a sense first made
precise in the context of cryptography by Naor in 2003 [23]. In Naor’s sense,
an assumption is falsifiable if there is “a (constructive) way to demonstrate that
it is false, if this is the case.” Concretely, he considers assumptions in which
a challenger publishes a challenge, and a verifier verifies whether a given solu-
tion to the challenge is correct (possibly with the help of some additional secret
information that is generated together with the challenge but not published).
The assumption, then, is that it is infeasible to produce a valid solution when
given only the challenge. The CDH assumption, for instance, is of this form: the
challenger generates the generator g and the integers a and b, computes and pub-
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lishes (g, ga, gb), and keeps a and b as secret information. The verifier, for its part,
uses g and the secret integers a and b to compute gab and accepts a purported
solution h if and only if h = gab. KEA1, on the other hand, is not of this type,
for in order to verify that a solution is valid, the verifier would need to verify
that it was produced in a manner other than the prescribed one (formally, by an
adversary for which there is no extractor). We note, however, that a KEA was
falsified, in a different sense, by Bellare and Palacio [3].
Despite the questions surrounding their non-falsifiability, KEAs have still
been used to construct systems for which no construction was known under falsi-
fiable assumptions. Such constructions include efficient encryption schemes secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks [8], 3-round zero-knowledge protocols [3, 21, 22],
and succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge protocols [19, 13], a construct for
which non-falsifiable assumptions have been shown to be inherent [14]. More-
over, at least one such construction (a variant of the construction of [13, 25]) is
already being used in a practical system, namely the Zcash digital currency [30].
Roughly speaking, unlike prior digital currencies such as Bitcoin which are only
pseudonymous (meaning that each transaction publicly reveals the addresses of
the participants), Zcash uses the zero-knowledge property of the construction
of [13, 25] in order to be completely anonymous, meaning that no information
is revealed. However, for efficiency reasons, classical zero-knowledge protocols
such as those based on one-way functions [17] are not suitable, and succinct, non-
interactive protools must be used. Since such protocols require KEAs or other
non-falsifiable assumptions [14], it can be expected that KEAs will become in-
creasingly popular in the future, which makes it all the more important to have
a solid understanding of them.
1.2 Summary of Results
As mentioned above, Ghadafi and Groth firstly introduced a new class of
assumptions (the “target assumptions”) which generalises many pre-existing as-
sumptions. Secondly, they identify Uber-assumptions for this class, which include
a pre-existing family of assumptions (the q-GDHE family). Thirdly, they inves-
tigate the internal structure of the class of Uber-assumptions, and they show
among other results that the q-GDHE family appears to be strictly increasing.
In this thesis, we perform a similar analysis for KEAs, albeit in a slightly
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 10
different order. Namely, we firstly investigate the internal structure of the q-
PKE family of assumptions of Groth [19], showing that this family is increasing
in groups where a certain decisional assumption holds. (Roughly speaking, the
assumption is that given (g, ga, . . . , ga
q
) it is infeasible to distinguish ga
q+1
from
a random group element.)
Theorem 3.13 (Chapter 3)
Let G be a group generator, and q ∈ N∗. If q-DDHE and (q+1)-PKE hold for G,
then q-PKE holds for G.
We are unfortunately unable to prove that it is increasing in all groups,
or that it is strictly increasing, and leave those questions open for future work.
Nevertheless, we are able to prove a partial result that holds in all groups, as
a generalisation of a prior result (Proposition 2) from [3]. Namely, that result
showed that 1-PKE implies 0-PKE; we generalise it to show that q-PKE implies
0-PKE for all q.
Theorem 3.11 (Chapter 3)
Let G be a group generator, and q ∈ N. If q-PKE holds for G, then 0-PKE holds
for G.
Our reasons for focusing on the q-PKE family first are twofold. Firstly, since
the q-PKE family is to our knowledge the most general instance of KEAs in
the literature, its structure may be of independent interest. Secondly, studying
it provides useful background for our more general study of KEAs and can be
helpful in understanding both the general notion of KEAs, which is very different
from that of more common assumptions such as CDH, and the proof technique we
use. That proof technique was, as previously mentioned, introduced by Bellare
and Palacio in [3] but acknowledged by them as being due to Halevi. It is used
in that work to prove the result (Proposition 2) mentioned above, which to our
knowledge is the only result in the literature showing an implication between
two KEAs. Thus that technique is the only one currently known for proving
implications between KEAs, and it is the one we use.
Turning to our main goal of a classification of KEAs, we firstly define a large
class of assumptions, which we call “rational knowledge-of-exponent assumptions”
(RKEAs) and which generalises the q-PKE family. As mentioned previously, our
goal is to capture not only the KEAs that have appeared in the literature thus
far, but also some that may appear in the future. Roughly speaking, whereas in
a q-PKE assumption the adversary is given group elements of the form gx
i
for a
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random integer x, in a RKEA it is given elements of the form gai(x)/bi(x), where the
ai and bi are arbitrary polynomials in m variables and x is a random vector of m
integers. Note that q-PKE can be seen as a RKEA where the polynomials are in
one variable, ai(x) = x
i, and bi(x) = 1. Thus RKEAs are indeed a generalisation
of the q-PKE family.
Finally, as a first step towards a full classification of RKEAs we define a
subclass of RKEAs which we call “simple RKEAs”, analogously to the simple
target assumptions of Ghadafi and Groth, and as they show that simple target
assumptions imply all target assumptions, we show that simple RKEAs imply all
RKEAs.
Theorem 4.6 (Chapter 4)
For any (d,m, n)-RKEA A = (IA,VA,VA) there is a (nd,m, n)-simple RKEA
B = (IB,VB,VB) such that B implies A.
Unfortunately, we are unable to follow their next step and define a class of
univariate simple RKEAs which would imply all simple RKEAs, and we leave
this question open for future work.
1.3 Organisation
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, we review
some basic definitions and notation, as well as some background in probabil-
ity and complexity theory. In Chapter 3, we discuss the q-power knowledge-of-
exponent (q-PKE) family of assumptions, starting from the first KEA introduced
by Damg̊ard [8], which as we will see can be viewed as a member of this family, up
to its formal introduction by Groth [19]. We then study its internal structure and
show that it is increasing in some cases. In Chapter 4, we propose a generalisation
of the q-PKE family which we call “rational knowledge-of-exponent assumptions”
(RKEAs) and, as a first step towards identifying Uber-assumptions for RKEAs,
we show that all RKEAs are implied by a slightly smaller class of assumptions
(the “simple RKEAs”). Finally, in Chapter 5 we summarise our results and point
out possible directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Sets, integers, and strings
We shall not define set, but shall just hope that when such
expressions as “the set of all real numbers” or “the set of all
members of the United States Senate” are used, people’s various
ideas of what is meant are sufficiently similar to make
communication feasible.
John B. Fraleigh, A First Course in Abstract Algebra [12]
Operations on sets. Given a sequence A1, A2, . . . of subsets of some “universal
set” Ω, their union, noted
⋃∞
i=1 Ai is the set of elements of Ω that are in at least
one of the Ai, and their intersection, noted
⋂∞
i=1 Ai is the set of elements of Ω
that are in all of them. Given a subset A of Ω, its complement, noted Ac or A or
Ω \ A, is the set of all elements of Ω that are not in A. We have the de Morgan
laws.
Proposition 2.1 (The de Morgan laws)

















Integers and strings. N = {0, 1, 2, . . . } is the set of natural numbers (or
natural integers); N∗ = N \ {0} is the set of positive integers. For any n ∈ N,
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set of all finite binary strings. For any n ∈ N∗, |n| = ⌊log2(n)⌋+1 is the length of
the usual binary representation of n, and for convenience we set |0| = 0. (We also
use |x| to denote the absolute value of a real number x, but the meaning of such
notation should always be clear from the context.) For any n ∈ N, 1n is the string
of length n with all bits 1. Fp denotes the finite field with p elements, represented
as the integers {0, . . . , p−1} with addition and multiplication modulo p (we only
consider prime finite fields). R denotes the field of real numbers. ε denotes the
empty string.
Asymptotics. Let f : N → R be a function. We say that f is positive if
f(n) > 0 for all n. We say that f is polynomial (in n), and we write f(n) ≤
poly(n) if there is a polynomial p such that f(n) ≤ p(n) for all n. We say that f
is negligible if for all positive polynomials p and all sufficiently large n we have
f(n) < 1/p(n). When such is the case we write f(n) ≤ negl(n), and if n is the
security parameter κ, we omit it and write ν ≤ negl. Given another function
g : N → R, we note f = Θ(g) if there are two positive real numbers k1, k2 such
that for all sufficiently large n we have k1 · g(n) ≤ f(n) ≤ k2 · g(n).
2.2 Probability
We quickly review the basic objects of probability theory [20].
2.2.1 Probability spaces
Definition 2.2 (σ-algebras)
Let A be a collection of subsets of Ω. A is a σ-algebra (on Ω) if the following
conditions hold.
1. Ω ∈ A.
2. For any A ∈ A, Ac ∈ A.
3. For any sequence A1, A2, . . . of elements of A,
⋃∞
i=1 Ai ∈ A.
Definition 2.3 (Measurable spaces)
A pair (Ω,Σ) where Ω is a set and Σ is a σ-algebra on Ω is called a measur-
able space. The elements of Σ are called the measurable subsets of Ω (in the
measurable space (Ω,Σ)).
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Definition 2.4 (Probability measures)
Given a measurable space (Ω,Σ), P is a probability measure on (Ω,Σ) if the
following conditions hold.
1. For any A ∈ Σ, P (A) is a non-negative real number, called the probability
of A.
2. P (Ω) = 1.
3. If A1, A2, . . . are pairwise disjoint elements of Σ ( i.e., if Ai∩Aj = ∅ when-













Definition 2.5 (Probability spaces)
A probability space is a triple (Ω,Σ, P ) such that the following conditions hold.
1. Ω is a set, called the sample space.
2. Σ is a σ-algebra on Ω ( i.e., (Ω,Σ) is a measurable space). The elements of
Σ are called events.
3. P is a probability measure on (Ω,Σ), called the probability distribution.
For each ω ∈ Ω, if {ω} is an event (i.e., if it is in Σ), it is called an elementary
event. A probability space is called finite if its sample space is finite. In the
following, we assume that Ω is finite and not empty, and that Σ = P(Ω), the
set of all subsets of Ω. (Most commonly, Ω will be the set of strings of some
fixed length.) It is clear that the probability distribution is then completely
determined by the probabilities of all the elementary events, and that the sum of
those probabilities equals 1. An important special case is when P ({ω}) = 1/|Ω|
for all ω ∈ Ω; the probability distribution P is then said to be uniform. In the
following, we will sometimes abuse notation and write P (ω) instead of P ({ω}) to
denote the probability of the elementary event {ω}.
Example 2.6 (Throw of a die)
The experiment of throwing a (fair) six-sided die can be formalised by a probabil-
ity space with sample space {1, . . . , 6} where the probability of each elementary
event is 1/6 (i.e., the probability distribution is uniform). The elementary event
CHAPTER 2 PRELIMINARIES 15
{n} naturally represents the case when the n side comes up. We can then con-
sider non-elementary events, for example the event {2, 4, 6} represents the case
where the side which comes up is even, and the probability of this event is 1/2,
as intuition dictates.
2.2.2 Independence and conditional probabilities
The notion of independence formalises the perception that past events do
not influence the outcome of future ones or provide any information about them.
Put another way, if two events are independent, the order in which they occur is
of no consequence, and it may sometimes help to think of one occurring after the
other, even if it actually occurs before.
Definition 2.7 (Independent events)
Let A1, . . . , An be events on (Ω,Σ, P ). Those events are said to be independent











They are said to be pairwise independent if any two of them are independent,
i.e., if
P (Ai ∩ Aj) = P (Ai) · P (Aj)
whenever i 6= j.
Example 2.8
Considering again the case of a fair six-sided die, the events odd = {1, 3, 5} and
lowerhalf = {1, 2, 3} are not independent, because P (odd) = P (lowerhalf) = 1/2,
whereas P (odd ∩ lowerhalf) = 1/3 6= 1/2 · 1/2. On the other hand the events odd
and lowerthird = {1, 2} are independent.
The definition of independence naturally leads to conditional probabilities.
Intuitively, independence of two eventsA andB means that the probability thatB
occurs is not changed if we “know” that A has occurred. Conditional probabilities
formalise “the probability that B occurs if we know that A has occurred”.
Definition 2.9 (Conditional probabilities)
Let A and B be two events, with P (A) > 0. Then the conditional probability of
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B given A is
P (B | A) =
P (A ∩ B)
P (A)
.
Clearly, A and B are independent if and only if P (B | A) = P (B).
Example 2.10
With the notation above, we have P (odd | lowerhalf) = 2/3. Intuitively, of the
three possible “lower half” results, two are odd, so if we know that the result
is in the lower half, the probability that it is odd becomes 2/3. (An equivalent
experiment would be to throw an imaginary three-sided die.)
2.2.3 Random variables
Definition 2.11 (Random variables)
A random variable on a probability space (Ω,Σ, P ) is a function from Ω to R.
A random variable X on a probability space (Ω,Σ, P ) induces a probability
distribution P on the measurable space (R,P(R)) by





For a subset A of R, P(A) naturally represents the probability that the random
variable X takes a value in A, and in particular P({a}) for some a ∈ R represents
the probability that the value of X equals a.
Example 2.12 (A dice game)
Suppose we play a game where, upon the throw of a fair six-sided die, we gain
three dollars if the five or six side comes up and lose one dollar otherwise. We have
as before Ω = {1, . . . , 6}, and the random variable X representing the amount of
money gained is defined as
X(5) = X(6) = 3
and
X(1) = X(2) = X(3) = X(4) = −1.
We thus have




and likewise P({−1}) = 2/3, which means that the probability that we gain three
dollars (resp., lose one dollar) is 1/3 (resp., 2/3).
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In the following, P will usually be uniform, and we will only be interested
in P. Thus we identify the two, and for a subset A of R we write P (X ∈ A)
instead of P(A). Moreover, if A = {a} for some a ∈ R, we write P (X =
a). Thus in the end when we write P (X ∈ A) (resp., P (X = a)) we mean
P (X−1(A)) (resp., P (X−1({a}))). Similarly, we will write P (X < a), P (X ≤ a),
etc. When we write P (A), without any symbol, A is an element of Σ, as in
the formal definition of P . We will also abuse terminology slightly and consider
random variables that are mappings from Ω to some set S other than R. If S is
finite, we then say that a random variable X : Ω→ S is uniformly distributed if
P (X = s) = 1/|S| for all s ∈ S.
2.2.4 The Schwartz-Zippel lemma
We will use the following result, often called the Schwartz-Zippel lemma
although its origin is unclear [2, Lemma A.36].
Proposition 2.13 (The Schwartz-Zippel lemma)
Let f be a non-zero polynomial in n variables and of degree at most d over a finite
field Fq. Then if a vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is chosen uniformly in F
n
q we have




Proof. The proof is by induction on n. The case n = 1 follows from the well-
known fact that a non-zero polynomial in one variable and of degree d over a field
has at most d roots in that field.
Suppose now that the result holds for some n ≥ 1, and consider a non-
zero polynomial f in n + 1 variables and of degree r ≤ d. We can view f
as a polynomial in one variable Xn+1 and whose coefficients are polynomials in
n variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn:




fk(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) ·X
k
n+1.
Since f is a non-zero polynomial, there is a k such that fk is a non-zero polynomial;
we consider the largest such k, and we note that the degree of fk equals r − k ≤
d − k. Since we assume that the result holds for all polynomials in n variables,
we obtain that, if x1, x2, . . . , xn are chosen uniformly, fk(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 0 with
probability at most (d− k)/q.
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If fk(x1, x2, . . . , xn) 6= 0, then the polynomial f(x1, x2, . . . , xn, Xn+1) in one
variable Xn+1 is of degree k, and so if xn+1 is uniformly chosen we have f(x1, x2,
. . . , xn+1) = 0 with probability at most k/q.
On the sample space Fn+1q with uniform probability distribution, we consider
two events. A is the set of vectors (x1, x2, . . . , xn+1) such that f(x1, x2, . . . , xn+1)
= 0; we want to show that P (A) ≤ d/q. B is the set of vectors such that fk(x1, x2,
. . . , xn) = 0. We have seen above that P (B) ≤ (d−k)/q and that P (A|B) ≤ k/q.
We thus obtain
P (A) = P (A ∩ B) + P (A ∩ B)
= P (A ∩ B) + P (B) · P (A |B)











2.3 Computational complexity and algorithms
As mentioned in the Introduction, our approach is based on computational
complexity theory: we wish to argue that some computational tasks are impossi-
ble to perform efficiently. Of course, this means that we first need a notion of what
it means for a computation to be efficient. At first glance, this seems to depend
heavily on the computing hardware: we intuitively know that what is “efficient”
on a modern computer might not be so on a more ancient one. Nevertheless,
we can devise a computation model, the Turing machine, which can simulate
any physically realisable computing machinery sufficiently accurately to enable
us to have a sensible notion of “efficient” computation (and of computational
complexity in general), independently of technology*1).
2.3.1 Turing machines
Although we rarely need to delve into the details of Turing machines, it is still
useful to have at our disposal a precise model to which we can refer when needed,
∗1) A possible exception is quantum computers, which are suspected (but not proven) to be
impossible to simulate with Turing machines. Quantum computers are also not proven to
be physically realisable.
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and so we will briefly introduce them here (for details, see any text on complexity
theory, such as [2]). Jumping ahead, we note that the actual computational model
we will use is the one introduced by Abe and Fehr [1], which we will describe at
the end of this chapter as a variant of those described beforehand.
Definition
A Turing machine is composed of one or more tapes (analogous to the mem-
ory of modern computers) of infinite length. Each tape is divided into cells, and
each cell contains a symbol. Each tape also comes with a head (which is analo-
gous to the processor). At each step of the computation, the machine starts by
reading the symbols which lie under the head of each tape. Then, depending on
the symbols read and on its program, it performs the following actions.
1. It writes a new symbol under the head of each tape (the new symbol may
be the same as the old one, so the machine is allowed to effectively not write
anything).
2. It separately moves each head one cell to the left or to the right on the
corresponding tape (again, it is also allowed to leave one or more heads in
their current positions).
3. It proceeds to the next step of the computation.
Concretely, we define our flavour of Turing machines (following [2]) as follows.
• Our machines have k > 1 tapes. One of them is the input tape, which
contains the input of the computation and which is “read-only”. All the
other tapes are “read-write”, and one of them is the output tape, where the
output of the computation is written (the other tapes are generally called
the work tapes).
• The set of symbols, or alphabet, is noted Γ. It contains the symbols 0 and 1,
as well as two special symbols: the blank symbol  and the start symbol ⊲.
• The set of states of the machine is noted Q. It contains at least the initial
state qstart and the final state (or halting state) qhalt.
• The transition function of the machine, which is the “program” indicating
which actions the machine performs as a function of its read symbols and
current state, is noted δ. Formally, it is a function from Γk × Q (read
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symbols and current state) to Γk−1 × {◭,H,◮}k × Q (written symbols,
head movements, and new state).
At the start of the computation, the machine is in the initial state qstart. The
tapes contain the start symbol ⊲ followed by infinitely many blank symbols ,
except the input tape, which contains the start symbol, then the input of the
computation, then the blank symbols. The heads are all at the beginning of
their respective tapes. For example, with three tapes (the brackets indicate the
positions of the heads):
[⊲]        · · ·
[⊲]        · · ·
[⊲] 1 0 0 1 1   · · ·
The computation then begins; it simply consists of repeated application of
the transition function. During the computation, the tapes may look like this:
⊲ []       · · ·
⊲ 0 0 [0] 1 0 1  · · ·
⊲ 1 0 0 1 [1]   · · ·
The computation ends when the machine enters the terminal state qhalt (we
then say that the machine halts). Then it performs no further action, and the
output of the computation is the contents of the output tape. The output of
a machine M on input x, assuming that M halts on input x, is noted M(x).
Given a function T : N → N, we say that a machine runs in time T (n) if for
all input strings x ∈ {0, 1}∗ it halts after at most T (|x|) steps. We say that
the machine runs in polynomial time if there is a polynomial p(n) such that the
machine runs in time p(n). A machine that runs in polynomial time is also called
a polynomial-time machine.
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Example: Palindromes
We will define a Turing machine which decides whether its input string is a
palindrome, i.e., whether it is read in the same way from left to right and from
right to left (for example 0010100 and 10001 are palindromes, but 100110 is not),
again following [2]. As above, our machine has three tapes (input, work and out-
put), and its alphabet is Γ = {0, 1,, ⊲}. To determine its states and transition
function, it is helpful to start with a high-level description of the computation.
1. Copy the entire input on the work tape.
2. Go back to the start of the input tape (staying at the end of the work tape).
3. [Finished?] If we are at the end of the input tape and at the start of the
work tape, output 1 and halt.
4. [Test] If the symbols under the input and work tape are different, output 0
and halt. Otherwise, move one position to the right on the input tape, one
position to the left on the work tape, and go to step 3.
In detail, we have five states Q = {qstart, qcopy, qleft, qtest, qhalt}, and the transi-
tion function is defined as follows.
• In state qstart, the machine moves all the heads one position to the right
without writing anything (more accurately, rewriting the ⊲ symbol) and
enters state qcopy.
• In state qcopy, if the symbol on the input tape is not the  symbol, the
machine copies it on the work tape, moves both heads to the right, and
remains in state qcopy. Otherwise, it moves them to the left, writes nothing,
and enters state qleft. (In both cases, the head of the output tape does not
move and writes nothing.)
• In state qleft, if the symbol on the input tape is not ⊲, the machine moves
its head to the left, writes nothing, and remains in state qleft. Otherwise,
it moves it to the right, still writing nothing, and enters state qtest.
• In state qtest, if the symbol on the input tape is  and the symbol on
the work tape is ⊲, the machine writes 1 on the output tape and enters
qhalt. Otherwise, if the symbols on the input and work tapes are different,
it writes 0 on the output tape and enters qhalt. Otherwise, it moves the
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heads of the input and work tapes to the right and the left respectively, and
remains in state qtest.
It is easily seen that this machine correctly decides whether its input is a
palindrome. As for its running time, we see that on input x it always spends 1
step in state qstart, then |x| + 1 steps in state qcopy, then again |x| + 1 steps in
state qleft, then finally at most |x|+ 1 steps in state qtest (if the string is indeed a
palindrome). It will therefore always halt after at most 3|x| + 4 steps, and so it
runs in polynomial time.
2.3.2 Probabilistic Turing machines
One aspect of “real programs” that does not seem to be captured by the
foregoing definition of Turing machines is the ability to make random choices.
Since our approach is to not make any assumption about the strategy employed by
an adversary, and since many practical programming languages provide a random
number generator, it seems reasonable to model adversaries with machines that
can access a source of randomness. Such machines were first introduced by Rabin
in 1976 [26]; we discuss them following [2, Chap. 7].
Definition 2.14 (Probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) Turing machines)
A probabilistic Turing machine is a Turing machine with an additional, read-
only tape called the random tape. A probabilistic Turing machine is said to run
in polynomial time if there is a polynomial p such that for any strings x ∈ {0, 1}∗
and r ∈ {0, 1}p(|x|), the machine halts after at most p(|x|) steps on input x when
its random tape initially contains the string r. A probabilistic Turing machine that
runs in polynomial time is called a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) Turing
machine. We call the string r the random coins of the machine, and we denote
by M(x; r) the output of a PPT machine M on input x and random coins r.
Remark 2.15
When we need to make explicit the fact that a polynomial-time Turing machine is
not probabilistic, we will call it a deterministic polynomial-time (DPT) machine.
The execution of a PPT Turing machine M on inputs of length n naturally
induces a probability space with sample space {0, 1}p(n) and uniform probability
distribution. For any x ∈ {0, 1}n, we can then define a random variable by
mapping any r ∈ {0, 1}p(n) to the string M(x; r). This random variable naturally
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represents the output of M on input x, and we note it M(x); thus for example
the probability that M outputs 1 on input x is






∣{r ∈ {0, 1}p(n) |M(x; r) = 1}
∣
∣ .
2.3.3 Non-uniform Turing machines
Definition 2.16 (Non-uniform polynomial-time Turing machines)
A non-uniform Turing machine is a Turing machine with an additional, read-only
tape called the advice tape, together with an infinite sequence of advice strings
adv0, adv1, . . . . A non-uniform Turing machine is said to run in polynomial time
if there is a polynomial p such that for any string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the machine halts
after at most p(|x|) steps on input x when its advice tape initially contains the
string adv|x|. A non-uniform Turing machine that runs in polynomial time is
called a non-uniform polynomial-time Turing machine, and we denote by M(x)
the output of such a machine M on input x.
We can combine probabilistic and non-uniform Turing machines to yield non-
uniform probabilistic Turing machines, which have both a random tape and an
advice tape. We say that a machine runs in non-uniform probabilistic polynomial
time if there is a polynomial p such that for all strings x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and r ∈
{0, 1}p(|x|) it halts after at most p(|x|) steps on input x when the strings r and
adv|x| are initially written respectively on its random and advice tapes. Such
a machine is called a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time (non-uniform
PPT) machine.
2.3.4 The model we use
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we will use a variant of Turing
machines first introduced by Abe and Fehr [1]. All our machines will have an
additional, read-only tape that we will call the security parameter tape and that
will initially contain the string 1κ, for a security parameter κ. All machines will
run in time polynomial in κ, meaning that whenever we consider a machine it is
assumed that there is a polynomial p such that the machine always halts after
at most p(κ) steps (where κ is the length of the string on its security parameter
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tape), regardless of the initial contents of all its other tapes (in particular, of its
input tape, which we may thus assume to have length at most p(κ)).
Such machines can be probabilistic, meaning that they have a random tape
which initially contain the random coins (of length p(κ)) and that their output (on
a given input and security parameter) can be viewed as a random variable over
the sample space of all possible random coins with uniform distribution. They
can also be non-uniform, but with the advice string depending on the security
parameter instead of on the length of the input (i.e., the string written on the
advice tape is advκ, which may also be assumed to have length at most p(κ)).
Thus the output of such a machine A on input x and security parameter κ
is A(1κ, x) or A(1κ, x, advκ). To ease notation, however, 1
κ and advκ will often
be omitted (i.e., we will often write A(x) instead of A(1κ, x) or A(1κ, x, advκ)).
For two machines A and B we denote by A||B their joint execution on a common
input and random tape, and we write (u; v)← (A||B)(x) to say that the output
of A on input x is assigned to u and the output of B on the same input x and the
same random coins is assigned to v. We note that it makes sense to say that A
and B are executed on the same random coins: if A (resp., B) runs in time pA(κ)
(resp., pB(κ)), then both machines can be seen as running in time (pA + pB)(κ),
with random coins of equal length.
Chapter 3
The q-PKE family of assumptions
In this chapter we discuss the KEAs that have appeared in the literature thus far,
from the first KEA of Damg̊ard [8] to the q-PKE family of Groth [19]. (The title of
this chapter is justified by the fact that all those KEAs can be seen as members
of the q-PKE family, or close variants thereof.) We then show two theorems
regarding the internal structure of the q-PKE family, which, as mentioned in the
Introduction, indicate that it is increasing.
3.1 Group generators
As is common in modern practice, we will define assumptions relative to an
abstract group generator, as opposed to defining them in specific groups. We
define group generators following Ghadafi and Groth [15].
Definition 3.1 (Group generators)
A group generator is a uniform probabilistic algorithm G which on security pa-
rameter κ outputs group parameters (Gp, g), where
• p is a prime with |p| = Θ(κ);
• Gp is (a description of) a (cyclic) group of order p, with canonical repre-
sentations of group elements as bitstrings and efficient algorithms for per-
forming the group operation and deciding membership; and
• g is a uniformly random generator of Gp.
Example 3.2
A simple example of a group generator that is used often in practice is one that
produces a prime-order subgroup of the multiplicative group of a prime finite
25
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field. Namely, on input 1κ it generates a prime q of length κ + 1 such that
p = (q−1)/2 (which is of length κ) is also prime. The group Gp is then the order-p
subgroup of F∗q, which is the group of quadratic residues modulo q; its elements
are represented as bitsrings by their usual binary representation. The integer q
suffices as a description of this group: the group operation is just multiplication
modulo q, and testing whether an element a ∈ F∗q is in Gp can be done by testing
whether a(q−1)/2 mod q equals 1. Finally, a generator g can be chosen uniformly
by choosing uniformly an integer i ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} and outputting g = 4i mod q
(4 = 22 is a generator of Gp since it is a quadratic residue, it is not 1, and the
group has prime order).
As in [15], given a group Gp, a generator g, and an element x ∈ Fp, we
will denote by [x] the element of Gp with discrete logarithm x relative to the
generator g and the group operation of Gp, i.e., [x] = g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g for x terms.
Thus the generator g is [1] and the identity element is [0]. We will also denote
the group operation additively, so that we have [x+ y] = [x] + [y] and [kx] = k[x]
(where k[x] = [x] + [x] + · · ·+ [x] for k terms).
3.2 The first knowledge-of-exponent assumption (KEA1)
As mentioned, the first knowledge-of-exponent assumption, which we call
KEA1 following Bellare and Palacio [3], was introduced by Damg̊ard in 1991
[8]. Roughly, it says that given a pair ([1], [α]) of elements of Gp, the only way to
generate a pair ([k], [kα]) is the obvious way: pick k in some fashion, and compute
[k] = k[1] and [kα] = k[α]. In other words, any algorithm (adversary) which
outputs such a pair must “know” k. This is formalised by saying that there must
exist another algorithm, called an extractor, which, also given ([1], [α]), outputs
k.
Assumption 3.3 (KEA1)
Let G be a group generator. We say that KEA1 holds (relative to G) if for every
non-uniform probabilistic algorithm A (the adversary) there is a non-uniform
probabilistic algorithm χA (the extractor) such that
Pr
[
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Remark 3.4
In the above probabilistic statement, the probability is taken over the random
coins of G andA||χA and the uniform choice of α ∈ Fp. In other words, the sample
space is {0, 1}pG(κ) × {0, 1}pA||χA (κ) × Fp with uniform probability distribution.
Other probabilistic statements throughout should be read similarly.
Remark 3.5
In [13, 25], KEAs are augmented to take into account any prior information
the adversary might possess. Namely, the adversary has an additional auxiliary
input z, and the condition must hold for all z generated independently of α. (Of
course, the extractor is given z as well.)
In [8], KEA1 is used to show that a variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme
[11] is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks by asserting that the only way for
an adversary to produce a valid ciphertext (i.e., one that is accepted by the
decryption oracle) is to encrypt a known plaintext (in which case the decryption
gives no advantage).
KEA1 is a very strong assumption. For instance, it is easily shown that,
under KEA1, the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem implies that of
the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, whereas the same implication in the
general case is a longstanding open question. Nevertheless, KEA1 has been shown
to hold in the generic group model [6, 24, 29] independently by Abe and Fehr [1]
and by Dent [9].
3.3 The discrete logarithm assumption (DLA)
As in [3], we remark that if the discrete logarithm problem is easy (in groups
generated by G), then KEA1 trivially holds (in G), for in that case we can trivially
construct a KEA1-extractor χA for any A as follows. Since χA is given A’s input
and random coins, it can compute A’s output ([u], [v]), and furthermore, since the
discrete logarithm problem is easy, it can compute u from [u]. It then outputs u,
and if the discrete logarithm computation was successful (which happens with
high probability since the discrete logarithm problem is easy), it will be successful
as well.
Therefore, KEAs are only interesting in groups where the discrete logarithm
problem is (believed to be) hard, which are the groups commonly used in cryp-
tographic systems. We will thus assume throughout that the discrete logarithm
CHAPTER 3 THE Q-PKE FAMILY OF ASSUMPTIONS 28
problem is hard in the group generators we will consider, and we formalise this
assumption as follows.
Assumption 3.6 (The discrete logarithm assumption (DLA))
We say that DLA holds (relative to the group generator G) if for every non-
uniform probabilistic adversary A we have
Pr
[
(Gp, [1])← G;α← Fp : A(Gp, [1], [α]) = α
]
≤ negl.
3.4 More assumptions: KEA2 and KEA3
A second knowledge-of-exponent assumption (KEA2) was introduced by
Hada and Tanaka in 1998 [21, 22] to construct 3-round zero-knowlege proto-
cols, which had been a longstaning open problem. However, KEA2 was proven
false (under the DLA) by Bellare and Palacio in 2004 [3], a result which, besides
rendering the results of Hada and Tanaka vacuous, showed that it was possible
to falsify a KEA, albeit in a different sense than that of Naor [23]. Fortunately,
Bellare and Palacio were able to recover the results of Hada and Tanaka by using
another new assumption, named KEA3, and they also showed that KEA3 implies
KEA1, a result which we extend below.
Roughly, KEA2 states that given ([1], [x], [α], [αx]), there are only two ways
to produce a pair ([k], [kα]): generate k in some fashion and output either
(k[1], k[α]) or (k[x], k[αx]). Intuitively, it is easy to see why this assumption
should be false under the DLA: what about an adversary which generates k1, k2
and outputs (k1[1] + k2[x], k1[α] + k2[αx])? KEA2 asserts that such an adversary
should know either k1 + k2x or k1x
−1 + k2, but it seems impossible to compute
them without computing x and breaking the DLA. KEA3 addresses this issue in
the obvious manner, by asserting that the only way to generate a pair ([k], [kα])
is as above: generate k1, k2 and output (k1[1] + k2[x], k1[α] + k2[αx]). We now
turn to the formalisation of both assumptions.
Assumption 3.7 (KEA2)
Let G be a group generator. We say that KEA2 holds (relative to G) if for ev-
ery non-uniform probabilistic adversary A there is a non-uniform probabilistic
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extractor χA such that
Pr
[
(Gp, [1])← G; x, α← Fp;


















Let G be a group generator. We say that KEA3 holds (relative to G) if for ev-
ery non-uniform probabilistic adversary A there is a non-uniform probabilistic
extractor χA such that
Pr
[
(Gp, [1])← G; x, α← Fp;
σ := (Gp, [1], [x], [α], [αx]);
(








[u] 6= k1[1] + k2[x]
)]
≤ negl.
3.5 The q-PKE family of assumptions
In this section we describe the q-power knowledge-of-exponent (q-PKE) fam-
ily of assumptions, which was introduced by Groth in 2010 [19], and we prove two
theorems which indicate that this family of assumptions is increasing in strength
as the parameter q grows (i.e., that assumptions with a higher value of q imply
those with a lower value). We note that Groth showed in [19] that q-PKE holds
in the generic group model for any q.
Assumption 3.9 (The q-power knowledge-of-exponent assumption (q-PKE))
Let G be a group generator, and q ∈ N. We say that q-PKE holds (relative
to G) if for every non-uniform probabilistic adversary A there is a non-uniform
probabilistic extractor χA such that
Pr
[
(Gp, [1])← G; x, α← Fp;
σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq]);
(
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Remark 3.10
We can allow the parameter q to be any function of the security parameter κ; in
that case, the experiment on security parameter κ has σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q(κ)],
[α], [αx], . . . , [αxq(κ)]). Of course, since our algorithms run in time polynomial
in κ, we can assume that q(κ) is polynomial as well. To ease notation, we will
always simply write q.
We note that KEA1 is 0-PKE and that KEA3 is 1-PKE. As previously
mentioned, it was shown by Bellare and Palacio [3] that 1-PKE implies 0-PKE;
the proof there readily extends to show that, for any q, q-PKE implies 0-PKE.
For completeness and as a warm-up for what follows, we restate it here.
Theorem 3.11 (Generalisation of Proposition 2 from [3])
Let G be a group generator, and q ∈ N. If q-PKE holds for G, then 0-PKE holds
for G.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against 0-PKE; we first construct an adversary B
against q-PKE that uses A in a black-box manner. B has input
(Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq]);
it runs A on input (Gp, [1], [α]) and with its own random tape, and outputs the
pair ([u], [v]) output by A. Since q-PKE holds, there is an extractor χB for B with
negligible error probability ν; we construct an extractor χA for A that uses χB in
a black-box manner. χA proceeds as follows on input (Gp, [1], [α]).
• x← Fp.
• σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq]).





We claim that χA has (negligible) error probability ν.
We run the 0-PKE experiment. Firstly, A is run on input (Gp, [1], [α]), and
we let ([u], [v]) be its output. Then χA is run, again on input (Gp, [1], [α]) and
with the same random tape as A, and it runs χB on input σ and with its own
random tape. Now, observe that σ is distributed identically to the input to χB in
the experiment for q-PKE, and so, letting
(
([u′], [v′]); (k0, . . . , kq)
)
be the output
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with probability ν. Since B on input σ runs A on input (Gp, [1], [α]) and with the
same random tape as that with which A was run originally, we have ([u′], [v′]) =















As mentioned, the above result shows in particular that 1-PKE implies 0-
PKE. A natural question is then to ask whether this can be generalised to show
that in general (q + 1)-PKE implies q-PKE. We show that this is the case under
a variant of the decisional Diffie-Hellman exponent (DDHE) assumption.*1)
Assumption 3.12 (The q-decisional Diffie-Hellman exponent (q-DDHE) as-
sumption)
Let G be a group generator, A be a non-uniform probabilistic adversary, q ∈ N∗,
b ∈ {0, 1}. Consider the following experiment Expq-ddhe-bG,A (κ).
• (Gp, [1])← G; x, r ← Fp.
• If b = 0, then σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [r]); otherwise, σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . ,
[xq], [xq+1]).
























be the advantage of A (in q-DDHE) relative to G, and we say that q-DDHE holds
in G if every non-uniform adversary has negligible advantage, i.e., if for every
non-uniform adversary A, we have Advq-ddheG,A ≤ negl.
∗1) Unfortunately, since our proof relies on a decisional assumption, it does not apply in the bi-
linear setting, which is the setting in which q-PKE was introduced in [19] and subsequently
used in [13, 25].
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Theorem 3.13
Let G be a group generator, and q ∈ N∗. If q-DDHE and (q+1)-PKE hold for G,
then q-PKE holds for G.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against q-PKE; we first construct an adversary B
against (q + 1)-PKE that uses A in a black-box manner. B has input
(
Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q+1], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq+1]
)
;
it runs A on input
(
Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq]
)
and with its own random tape, and outputs the pair ([u], [v]) output by A. Since
(q + 1)-PKE holds, there is an extractor χB for B with negligible error probabil-
ity ν; we construct an extractor χA for A that uses χB in a black-box manner.
χA proceeds as follows on input (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq]).
• r ← Fp.
• σ := (Gp, [1], . . . , [x
q], [r], [α], . . . , [αxq], [αr]).
• (k0, k1, . . . , kq+1)← χB(σ).
• Output (k0 + kq+1r, k1, . . . , kq).
We claim that χA has negligible error probability.
We run the q-PKE experiment. Firstly, A is run on input
(Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq]),
and we let ([u], [v]) be its output. Then χA is run, on the same input and with
the same random tape as A, and it runs χB on input σ and with its own random
tape. We claim that, letting
(
([u′], [v′]); (k0, . . . , kq+1)
)
be the output of B||χB on













with negligible probability. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that, under
q-DDHE, σ is indistinguishable from the input to B||χB in the (q + 1)-PKE
experiment. To show it formally, we consider the following adversary Z against
q-DDHE, which uses B and χB in a black-box manner.
Z proceeds as follows on input (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [z]) (where x is random
and z is either xq+1 or random).
CHAPTER 3 THE Q-PKE FAMILY OF ASSUMPTIONS 33
• α← Fp.
• σ := (Gp, [1], [x], . . . , [x
q], [z], [α], [αx], . . . , [αxq], [αz]).
•
(
([u], [v]); (k0, k1, . . . , kq+1)
)
← (B||χB)(σ).
• If [v] = α[u] and kq+1[z] +
∑q
i=0 ki[x
i] 6= [u], output 1; else, output 0.
If z = xq+1, the q-DDHE experiment for Z is exactly the (q+1)-PKE experiment
for B||χB, and so Z outputs 1 with (negligible) probability ν. On the other hand,
if z is random, then σ is distributed identically to the input to B||χB when it is
run by χA in the q-PKE experiment. Let µ be the probability that Z outputs 1
in that latter case; then |ν − µ| is negligible since q-DDHE holds, and since ν is
negligible as well, so is µ.
Finally, since B on input σ runs A on input (Gp, [1], . . . , [x
q], [α], . . . , [αxq])
and with the same random tape as that with which A was run originally, we have















In this chapter, we propose a definition of a large class of assumptions, with the
goal of capturing not only the KEAs that have appeared in the literature thus
far, but also some that are likely to appear in the future. We then show that this
large class is implied by a slightly smaller subclass.
4.1 Definition of RKEAs
Along the lines of the definition of target assumptions by Ghadafi and Groth
[15], we generalise the PKE family of assumptions by allowing arbitrary rational
functions of several variables instead of just powers of x. We call the result-
ing class of assumptions rational knowledge-of-exponent assumptions (RKEAs).
Analogously to the target assumptions of [15], RKEAs are parameterised by three
integers*1) d (the maximal degree of the polynomials involved), m (the number of
variables) and n (the number of rational functions). We first define a very gen-
eral notion of non-interactive knowledge assumptions (NIKAs) analogous to the
non-interactive computational assumptions of Ghadafi and Groth [15]. (The in-
tuitive meanings of the quoted terms should be clear from the previous examples
of KEAs.)
Definition 4.1 (Non-interactive knowledge assumptions (NIKAs))
A non-interactive knowledge assumption consists of an instance generator I, a
verifier V, and a knowledge verifier V, defined as follows.
∗1) Again, we can allow d,m, n to be any functions of the security parameter κ, and assume
that they are polynomial.
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• (pub, priv) ← I: I is a uniform probabilistic algorithm which, on input 1κ
(where κ is a security parameter), outputs a pair of public/private informa-
tion (pub, priv). We omit the input 1κ as usual.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol): V is a uniform deterministic algorithm which, on
input (pub, priv) and a purported solution sol, outputs 1 if the solution is
“correct” and 0 otherwise.
• 0/1 ← V(pub, priv, sol, sec): V is a uniform deterministic algorithm which,
on input (pub, priv, sol) and a purported “secret” sec, outputs 1 if the secret
is “correct” and 0 otherwise.
We say that the assumption holds if for any non-uniform probabilistic algorithm A
(the adversary) there is a non-uniform probabilistic algorithm χA (the knowledge
extractor, or just the extractor) such that
Pr
[
(pub, priv)← I; (sol; sec)← (A||χA)(pub) :
V(pub, priv, sol) = 1 ∧ V(pub, priv, sol, sec) = 0
]
≤ negl.
We call the above probability the error probability of χA relative to A, and express
it as a function of the security parameter κ; thus the assumption holds if for every
adversary A there is an extractor χA with negligible error probability relative to A.
We also say that χA is successful (relative to A) if the condition above does not
hold, i.e., if χA “successfully extracts” A’s secret (hence the error probability is
the probability that the extractor is not successful).
Definition 4.2 (Rational knowledge-of-exponent assumptions (RKEAs))
For d,m, n ∈ N∗ and a group generator G, we say that (I,V ,V) is a (d,m, n)-
RKEA if there is a uniform probabilistic algorithm Icore such that I, V and V
are of the following forms.
• (pub, priv)← I:









← Icore(Gp), where the ais and bis are poly-
nomials in m variables and of total degree at most d.
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– Return
(





pub, priv, sol = ([u], [v])
)
: if [v] = α[u], return 1; else, return 0.
• 0/1← V
(









= [u], return 1;
else, return 0.
Remark 4.3
We note that in an RKEA the knowledge verifier V does not use the private in-
formation priv; thus RKEAs would also satisfy an alternative definition of NIKAs
where V is not given priv.
Example 4.4 (q-PKE)
q-PKE is a (q, 1, q+1)-RKEA, meaning that Icore generates q+1 rational functions
consisting of polynomials in one variable and of degree at most q. Namely, we
have ai(x) = x
i−1 and bi(x) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , q + 1.
4.2 Simplifications of RKEAs
As a first step towards identifying Uber-assumptions for the class of RKEAs,
in this section we define simple RKEAs analogously to the simple target assump-
tions of Ghadafi and Groth [15], and we show that simple RKEAs imply all
RKEAs.
Definition 4.5 (Simple RKEAs)
We say that an RKEA is simple if bi(X) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n, i.e., all the
rational functions output by Icore are just polynomials.
Theorem 4.6
For any (d,m, n)-RKEA A = (IA,VA,VA) there is an (nd,m, n)-simple RKEA
B = (IB,VB,VB) such that B implies A.












• ci(X) := ai(X) ·
∏
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Let A be an adversary against A; we first construct an adversary B against









































and with its own random tape, and outputs the pair output by A. Since we as-
sume that B holds, there is an extractor χB for B with negligible error probability














































and with its own random tape, and outputs the values (k1, . . . , kn) output by χB.




We run the NIKA experiment for A. Firstly, A is run on input pubA, and
we let ([u], [v]) be its output. Then, χA is run, again on input pubA and with the
same random tape as A, and it runs χB on input σB and with its own random
tape, outputting the output (k1, . . . , kn) of χB. We claim that σB is distributed
identically to pubB except with negligible probability. To see this, observe that IA
generates the polynomials ai(X) and bi(X) as well as the vector x independently
of the generator [1] output by G. Further, assuming that
∏n
i=1 bi(x) 6= 0, the only
difference between pubB and σB is the choice of generator; namely, if choosing






By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability that
∏n
i=1 bi(x) = 0 is at
most dn
p
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with probability at most ν + dn
p
. Observing that B, when run on input σB, runs
A on input pubA and with the same random tape as that with which A was run
originally shows that ([u′], [v′]) = ([u], [v]), which completes the proof.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis we have initiated an analysis of knowledge-of-exponent assumptions
(KEAs), with the goal of obtaining a classification of those assumptions analogous
to that obtained by Ghadafi and Groth for target assumptions [15]. Namely, we
sought to identify a large class of KEAs, and then a small subclass thereof such
that if all the assumptions in the small class hold, then all the assumptions in
the large class hold as well. (The assumptions in the small class are then called
“Uber-assumptions”.) The aim of such a classification is to provide designers of
cryptographic systems with a wide range of assumptions from which they may
choose the most suitable one for their purposes, while at the same time ensuring
that their validity relies on a small number of assumptions, which can then be
thoroughly studied.
In Chapter 3 we studied the internal structure of the q-power knowledge-of-
exponent (q-PKE) family of assumptions. This family of assumptions was intro-
duced by Groth [19] as a generalisation of assumptions that had been introduced
earlier by Damg̊ard [8] and by Bellare and Palacio [3] (the latter as a modification
of a faulty assumption of Hada and Tanaka [21, 22]), and was the most general
instance of KEAs in the literature. We proved two results which give evidence
that the assumptions in the q-PKE family increase in strength as the parameter q
grows. Namely, we showed that, for any q, q-PKE unconditionally implies 0-PKE,
and implies (q−1)-PKE under a decisional Diffie-Hellman-type assumption. The
first result is an extension of a prior result of Bellare and Palacio (due to Halevi)
[3], which showed merely that 1-PKE implies 0-PKE. Regarding the second re-
sult, we remark that its reliance on a decisional assumption is unfortunate, since
it means that it does not apply in bilinear groups.
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In Chapter 4, we introduced a further generalisation of the q-PKE fam-
ily of assumptions, which we named rational knowledge-of-exponent assumptions
(RKEAs), with the aim of capturing not only existing assumptions, but also oth-
ers which may appear in the future. This is again motivated by the desire to
have as large a class of assumptions as possible. Then, as a first step towards
identifying Uber-assumptions for RKEAs, we show that all RKEAs are implied
by the smaller subclass of simple RKEAs.
All our results were obtained using the proof technique from [3], which to our
knowledge, is thus far the only known method for proving implications between
KEAs. Indeed, to our knowledge, Proposition 4.2 from [3] was prior to this
work the only result in the literature that proved an implication between two
KEAs. Many directions for future work remain open, which might require the
introduction of new proof techniques.
• Is the q-PKE family strictly increasing? In other words, can it be shown in
some sense that q-PKE does not imply (q + 1)-PKE?
• Can RKEAs be simplified further as in [15]? In particular, can Uber-
assumptions be found? If not, can RKEAs be proved secure in the generic
group model [6, 24, 29]?
• Can RKEAs be generalised further, for instance by allowing V and V to be
of a more general form?
• Perhaps most importantly, can a similar analysis be done in the bilinear
setting, where KEAs are now primarily used?
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